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The Sublime is What Forces Us to Think 







Although Deleuze has written a whole volume on Kant, in the present essay I am paying 
close attention to a short and concentrated article of his on Kant’s third Critique entitled, 
The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Aesthetic, because in it Deleuze highlights how the 
sublime experience is conducive to the aesthetic ought in Kant’s architectonic system, 
and how the sublime experience is necessary to engender artistic creativity. I argue, that 
although Deleuze rejects Kant’s thesis that there should be universal rules which 
determine thinking, he does take up Kant’s ideas of there being various mental faculties 
or capacities, which need to work together to produce all forms of thought and creative 
output. The possible disharmony of the distinct faculties, the violence that one might 
commit over the other, as happens in Kant’s sublime experience, becomes the violence 
in Deleuze’s philosophy which engenders creativity and, ultimately, forces one to think.   
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The Sublime is What Forces Us to Think 







It is well-known that the works of Giles Deleuze have roots in his interpretation of 
previous philosophers, to whose mental portraits he dedicated the first decades of his 
career. However, these predecessors were not all seen as friends; in fact, the philosopher 
whose work challenged him for the longest time, Immanuel Kant, was referred to by 
him as foe1. 
Although Deleuze has written a whole volume on Kant, the focus of this essay will 
be a short and concentrated article of his on Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
entitled The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Aesthetics2, because this article was written 
between the book on Kant and Difference and Repetition and in it, Deleuze highlights 
several of his findings, to which he returns when outlining his own philosophical vision.  
Although Deleuze rejects Kant’s notion of transcendental logic, i.e. the idea that 
there should be universal rules which determine thinking, he does accept Kant’s ideas of 
there being various mental faculties or capacities which need to work together to 
produce thought or aesthetic ideas. The possible disharmony of these faculties, the 
violence that one might commit against the other, as happens in Kant’s sublime 
experience, is a topic, which Deleuze takes on and elaborates in his later works.  
 I would like to present how the above article on genesis in Kant’s aesthetics gives 
insight into the genesis of some key-terms in Deleuze’s own philosophy but, also, draw 
attention to this work as a significant and original piece of interpretation, which offers 
																																								 																				
1 From  Lettre á Michele Cressole cited in G. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy - The Doctrine of the 
Faculties (1963), translated by H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, The Athlone Press, London 1984, p. xv.  
2 G. Deleuze, The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Aesthetics (1963), in “Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical 
Humanities”, V/3, 2000, pp. 57-70. 
	




solution to several questions that have for long been the subject of ardent debate 
amongst Kant commentators.  
Deleuze tackles the most important interpretive questions of the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment from a systematic point of view, namely: how does the third 
Critique complete Kant’s critical oeuvre?  While solving this main issue he constructs 
an answer to a lesser but still puzzling sub-debate on why the sections of the Critique of 
Judgment follow each other in the order they do. That is to say, what explains that Kant 
exposes us to his theory of taste starting with the Analytic of the Beautiful followed by 
the Analytic of the Sublime and only subsequently performs the Deduction of the 
Judgment of Taste, finally finishing the aesthetic part of the third Critique with the 
sections on genius and art? 
 His answer to the architectonic question, in brief, proposes that the third Critique 
shows how an indeterminate relation between the faculties grounds their determined 
relations as described in the previous two Critiques. Furthermore, he takes Kant’s 
description of the sublime and proposes that the way the faculties relate to one another 
in the sublime provides us with the model of how the faculties, which create specific 
hierarchical structures to fulfil their speculative and practical functions, may free 
themselves from the thus created structures and may reorganize their relations in a 
different manner serving new functions.  
Seeing the description of the sublime as providing a key to a mechanism of 
reordering the faculties to function in new ways helps Deleuze explain why the sections 
of the CPJ follow each other in the way they do. I will now start unravelling the above 
interpretive issues. Subsequently, I will highlight how Deleuze’s reading of Kant feeds 
into his own work.  
In light of the above, I divided my paper into the following sections:  
I. Indeterminate accord as ground for possible cooperation between the faculties, 
II. The sublime as model for functional reorganization, 










1. The indeterminate accord of the faculties as ground for possible cooperation 
Contrary to the interpretive tradition which sees the harmony of the faculties as a 
particular joyous state of mind pertaining to judgments of taste, Deleuze claims that free 
harmony is a state of the faculties, which grounds all judgments3.  
To an extent Deleuze may argue for his position relying on a close reading of the text 
since Kant himself stipulates that an accord between the imagination and the 
understanding constitutes the subjective condition of a cognitive judgment. In the First 
Introduction to the CPJ we read:   
A merely reflecting judgment about a given individual object, however, can be aesthetic, if 
(before its comparison with others is seen), the power of judgment, which has no concept 
ready for the given intuition, holds the imagination (merely in the apprehension of the 
object) together with the understanding (in the presentation of a concept in general) and 
perceives a relation of the two faculties of cognition which constitutes the subjective, 
merely sensitive condition of the objective use of the power of judgment in general (namely 
the agreement of those two faculties with each other)4.  
There are several other passages in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, where Kant 
compares determinate and reflective judgment, and  emphasizes that the difference 
between an aesthetic reflective and a determinate judgment is that through determinate 
judgments we determine objects by bringing our sensible intuitions under concepts5, 
while in a reflective judgment we are faced with a particular representation for which 
we do not have a concept, thus we search for it. Kant’s remarks have led several 
commentators to search for the connection between cognizing and reflecting, and to 
conceive of the aesthetic-receptive state as a state which is, on the one hand, a type of 
reflection and, on the other, some type of contribution to or preparation for determining 
judgment.  
																																								 																				
3 Ivi, p. 62. In Kant’s Critical Philosophy Deleuze argues that the indeterminate accord of the faculties is 
reflective judgment itself. See: G. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy - The Doctrine of the Faculties 
(1963), cit., pp. 60-61. 
4 I. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 1790, translated and edited by P. Guyer & E. Matthews, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000, 20: 224. 
5 Without going into detail about Kant’s theory of how we arrive at empirical knowledge claims, in brief, 
what is at stake here is his conception that we arrive at judgments about empirical objects by bringing our 
particular. perceptual, sensible representations (intuitions) under concepts (universal, mediate 
representations based on rules).  
	




Paul Guyer, in a fairly recent volume dedicated to Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant`s 
Critical Philosophy6, divides various interpretive constructions of free play into three 
possible interpretive strategies, namely: (i) the precognitive (ii) the multi-cognitive, and 
(iii) the meta-cognitive approach7. In his rendition, the precognitive interpretation of the 
harmony of the faculties would envisage free play as a state of mind, which precedes 
bringing a sensible intuition under a determinate concept. On Guyer’s picture most 
interpreters represent such a precognitive view, since they emphasize that the mind`s 
engagement in free play occurs in a state when a sensible representation is being 
apprehended and comprehended, but not brought under any determinate concept. He 
assigns to this group the interpretations of Dieter Henrich, Donald Crawford, Ralf 
Meerbote, Hannah Ginsborg, Rudolf Makkreel, and Fred Rush.7 A slightly different  
interpretive strategy is when the free play of the faculties is seen not simply as a 
precognitive phase, but as a state of mind where we perceive something to which we 
might apply a number of determinate concepts. None is compelling, however, and 
therefore it is possible to play with equally applicable conceptual possibilities. This 
would be the multi-cognitive reading, represented by Gerhard Seel and, arguably, 
Malcolm Budd8. 
Guyer, however, raises criticism against both the precognitive and the multi-
cognitive stances on two grounds: (i) the precognitive approach maintains that pleasure 
is experienced  in a state of mind apt for making a determinate judgment, yet the 
judgment had not been carried out. The multi-cognitive approach maintains that 
pleasure is felt in a state of mind when multiple concepts might be applicable. But this 
poses the question: - why should we feel pleasure merely for being prepared to do a 
task, which has not even been carried out? Guyer makes this point with more precision: 
																																								 																				
6 P. Guyer, The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited, in R. Kukla (ed. by) Aesthetics and Cognition in 
Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006, pp. 162-193. 
7 Ivi, pp.165-170. Cf. D. Henrich, Kant’s Explanation of Aesthetic Judgment, in E. Förster (ed. by) 
Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1992, p.38. D. 
Crawford, Kant’s Aesthetic Theory, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1974, p. 90; R. Meerbote, 
Reflection on Beauty, in T. Cohen and P. Guyer (ed. by) Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 1982, pp. 55-86. R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, The 
Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1990, p.47. 
F. Rush, The Harmony of the Faculties, in “Kant Studien”, 92, 2001, pp. 57-58. 
8 Cf. G. Seel, Uber den Grund der Lust an schönen Gegenständen: Kritische Fragen an die Asthetik 
Kants, in H. Oberer and G. Seel (hrsg.v.) Kant: Analysen – Probleme –Kritik,  Königshausen & 
Neumann, Würzburg 1988, p. 344. M. Budd, The Pure Judgment of Taste as an Aesthetic Reflective 
Judgment, in “British Journal of Aesthetics”, XLI, 2001, p. 255. 
	




why should endless re-imaginings of cognitive possibilities come with pleasure? He 
notes that in some cases such an activity might be pleasurable, but in others frustrating9.  
 Guyer`s solution to the problem, as he conceives of it, is to give a ‘meta-cognitive 
reading’ of the harmony of the faculties, insisting that the aesthetic judgment does not 
replace the determinate judgment, but is additional to it. In his reading «the pleasure 
expressed by a judgment of taste must be connected to the satisfaction of our underlying 
objective in cognition, namely, the unification of our manifolds of intuition»10. The 
merit of such meta-cognitive reading would be to show, how in a judgment of taste the 
requisites of the first Critique for making a determinate judgment and the requisites of 
the third, that the judgment of taste is based on pleasure, are both met. We see and judge 
that ‘this is a rose’ and simultaneously we also feel pleasure and judge that ‘this rose is 
beautiful’. On Guyer’s account, the pleasure comes from how our perceptions or 
intuitions of the particular rose satisfactorily come together to form a unified 
representation. 
While all the above interpreters try to explain how the aesthetic state of mind, which 
Kant refers to as a merely reflective judgment, could be the subjective condition of all 
objective determinate judgments by comparing the cases of cognizing, i.e., getting to 
know an object with reflecting upon an object, Deleuze approaches the problem from a 
very different angle. He does not dwell on the relation between the cognitive and the 
aesthetic state. He does not make much of Kant’s remark that «the power of judgment 
has no concept ready for the given intuition» and does not think that holding «the 
imagination (merely in the apprehension of the object) together with the understanding 
(in the presentation of a concept in general)»11 should be something that follows from 
lacking a concept for a given intuition. To this extent, he agrees with Guyer that 
aesthetic pleasure cannot be explained if we approach it primarily as a lack (a lack of 
concepts). However, while Guyer argues for his own meta-cognitive stance still having 
cognition as an aim in mind, Deleuze leaves the cognizing paradigm behind. That is to 
say, Deleuze does not aim to show that aesthetic pleasure has anything to do with 
																																								 																				
9 P. Guyer, The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited, cit., p.177. 
10 Ivi, p.178. 








successful cognition, since he does not share the beliefs coming from an analytic, 
philosophy-of-mind tradition which asserts that the purpose of the mind was cognizing. 
Instead, Deleuze argues from a systematic point of view and says that what we need 
to compare is not a reflective judgment and a determinate judgment making a 
knowledge claim about our empirical experience, but any kind of judgment where the 
faculties are organized in relation to one another in a determinate manner with the state 
when the faculties are related to one another in an indeterminate manner.  
Thus, what Deleuze contributes to the analyses of the harmony of the faculties is the 
idea that what we have seen in Kant’s first two Critiques: the faculties cooperate with 
each other in a determinate manner, with one faculty in a leading role, strictly 
determining the operations of another faculty in order to complete a task. This is to say 
that in the first two Critiques Kant establishes that for a given task the faculties work 
together in a hierarchical manner. Namely, in the Critique of Pure Reason, we see the 
understanding determining the work of the imagination to arrive at determinate 
judgments concerning an object; in the Critique of Practical Reason we see the faculty 
of reason determine the understanding to arrive at a practical judgment. Deleuze argues 
that these determinate accords would not be possible if the faculties could not shift the 
way they relate to one another and re-establish their hierarchies in a new manner. In 
brief, the various hierarchical relations of the faculties are only possible if no hierarchy 
is stable, the faculties can shift and reorder themselves for the various activities of the 
mind12.  
Although, Deleuze’s argument has a certain logic to it, one could argue that if the 
faculties get disentangled from a previously established hierarchical state, such 
disentanglement does not guarantee that they do get attuned in some kind of an accord, 
not to mention pleasurable accord. Deleuze has to substantiate his claim with further 
arguments, which he does by analysing how the sequence of the sections in the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment are organized and by considering the experience of the 
sublime as a model for the reorganization of the faculties or, as he puts it, the model for 
the genesis of a certain organization of the faculties.   
																																								 																				
12 G. Deleuze, The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Aesthetics (1963), cit., p.60. For an extensive analyses on 
how one faculty determines the operations of another, see: G. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy - The 
Doctrine of the Faculties, cit.  
	




The most important observation about the sequence is that the section on the Analytic 
of the Sublime precedes the Deduction of Taste, and the reason for this, Deleuze argues, 
is that the model of experience encountered in the sublime informs the deduction. 
 
 
2. The model of facultary re-organization provided by the Analytic of the Sublime  
The faculty reorganization Deleuze has in mind, which happens during the sublime 
experience, consists of freeing the imagination from the guidance of the understanding 
and re-coupling it with reason.  
The sublime experience starts with the sighting of a natural scene which the mind 
tries to cognize in its usual way. This means that our faculties attempt to proceed along 
the steps of the three synthesis of object cognition delineated in the Critique of Pure 
Reason13. Therefore, in Kant’s terms, the mind attempts to apprehend, comprehend, and 
unify under a concept which it senses. However, in the case of sublime experience, the 
encountered scene is so enormous or so overwhelmingly powerful and chaotic that it 
cannot be comprehended in one image by the viewer’s imagination. In cognitive terms, 
this means that while the mind is capable of adding up the details of the sighted scene, 
the sighted phenomenon is so vast, seemingly ‘limitless’ or ‘formless’ that it cannot be 
unified in any one image, i.e., it cannot be comprehended. As a consequence, the 
imagination fails to fulfil its task in cognition under the guidance of the understanding, 
as the routine case would be. In this failure, however, reason is already implicated since, 
in Kant’s terms, it is speculative reason which figures that all objects must have limits 
and thus should be able to be comprehended as objects having a particular form14. It is 
reason which seeks to know the world as a re-presentable entity and thus, through the 
understanding, reason pushes the imagination to comprehend15. However, when this 
effort is produced in vain, something violent happens. The imagination’s repeated 
failure to comprehend the scene leads to a feeling of being overwhelmed, exhausted 
and, ultimately,  it leads to the moment of despair contained in the sublime. As Deleuze 
interprets it, despair pushes the mind to switch, the faculties to give up on cognizing, 
																																								 																				
13 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781), translated and edited by P. Guyer & A. Wood, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1998, A99-110 (pp. 228-234). 
14 Ivi, A516-523/B546-551. 
15 I. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, cit., 5:250-5:251. 
	




and the failure to accomplish  the impossible task becomes a presentation of precisely 
what  the mind cannot do: it cannot know the infinite. As Deleuze points out, the 
imagination provides us with a negative presentation of the infinite16. However, this 
also means that the imagination is no longer partnered with the understanding, but with 
reason. Deleuze argues that the faculty pushed to its limit is also freed; the imagination 
failing to comprehend stops trying to comprehend and moves towards a new role. 
Unbounded apprehending activity becomes the symbol of an unbounded world; the 
mind’s activity itself becomes the presentation of the idea of infinity17.  
According to the dominant Kant interpretation, the fact that reason is  ready with an 
idea for that which the imagination, guided by the understanding, cannot know, brings 
with itself the realization that reason, which can think the super-sensible, is superior to 
understanding and sensibility which can only cognize the empirical in a limited way. 
We can conclude that reason is our strongest power, the true precursor of the human 
vocation. The rational being triumphs over the sensible being.  
 However, in Deleuze’s reading, there is a richer yield. The discord brought about by 
the confrontation with a sensible site which puts the imagination to its limit, will be the 
model for Deleuze’s theory about what it is that forces us to think. Although skillful 
application of concepts may amount to an artful activity in its own right, as in the 
example of the doctor who already has the diagnosis for an illness, but needs to decide 
on the applicable cure in the light of contra-indications, such an artful case of 
determinate judgment, still does not necessitate activation of deeper, original, 
spontaneous powers. Original spontaneity, the original, active, creative power of the 
faculties only comes to light in reflective judgment. Only in reflective judgment, when 
«nothing is given from the standpoint of the active faculties; only a raw material 
presents itself, without really being “represented”»18, only in such cases can the active 
powers of the mind demonstrate their original creativity.  Because vis-a-vis such raw-
material, when the sensible given is presented but not yet represented or, in specifically 
Kantian terms, apprehended but not comprehended, «all the active faculties of the mind 
are exercised freely»19.  
																																								 																				
16 G. Deleuze, The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Aesthetics (1963), cit., p.63. 
17 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, cit., §§ 26-29. 
18 G. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy - The Doctrine of the Faculties, cit., p.60. 
19 Ibid.  
	




In the interpretation of Deleuze, this free exercise of the mind’s active or 
constructive faculties is exactly what Kant calls reflection and what, as Deleuze has 
shown, boils down to an indeterminate accord20, an accord where no faculty has a 
leading, determining role, thus the outcome of the reflective act can yield something 
creative, something new, be it an idea, an image, or a decision. 
 
 
3. The Deduction of Taste is based on a meta-aesthetic interest: the shift from 
determining judgment to reflective judgment is made by reason 
The sections on the sublime in the Critique of the Power of Judgment are followed by 
the Deduction of Taste. In the Analytic of Taste, Kant spells out how one of the defining 
features, one of the ‘moments’ of experiencing something beautiful, is that we expect 
our experience of beauty to be universally shareable. However, in the Analytic, Kant 
does not deduce what the a priori principle might be which gives rise to this 
expectation. 
The task of the Deduction is to explain why an ought is attached to judgments of 
taste. Why is it that we expect universal acclaim for the music of Bach and Mozart? - 
muses Deleuze21. If the judgment of taste is subjective, based on pleasure, why should 
we expect it to be universal? 
This claim for universal approval is what requires a deduction. What the deduction 
reveals is that the claim comes from an interest of reason. Although the judgment of 
taste is disinterested, the hope that nature could be harmonized with human purpose the 
finding that nature produces forms which are in accord with the pleasurable, and the 
indeterminate purposive relation of the faculties is in the interest of reason, such 
disinterested pleasure in nature gives hope that human purpose is realizable in an 
environment determined by causal, mechanical laws. What Deleuze adds to Kant’s 
theory is that this free relation of the faculties is generated by reason in a similar way to 
its generation of the sublime. 
 In the CPK he puts the problem in the following terms: 
																																								 																				
20 It would be worthy to contrast in further research the standpoint of Deleuze’s compatriot, Lyotard who 
insists that the accord of the faculties is but a promise with Deleuze’s who insists that indeterminate 
accord of the faculties is the ground of their cooperation in determinate forms. Cf. F. Lyotard, Leçons sur 
l'Analytique du Sublime, Éditions Galilée, Paris 1991. 
21 G. Deleuze, The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Aesthetics (1963), cit., p. 61. 
	




But is it sufficient to assume this free accord, to suppose it a priori? Must it not be, on the 
contrary, produced in us? That is to say: should aesthetic common sense not be the object 
of a genesis, of a properly transcendental genesis? This problem dominates the first part of 
the Critique of Judgement; there are several complex points in its solution22. 
It is reason that frees the imagination from the yoke of the understanding and instigates 
it to return to its original, spontaneously schematizing activity, taking  pleasure in the 
forms produced by nature. Imagination, reflecting on form, compares, superimposes, 
and playfully reproduces the received intuited form, and this spontaneous activity 
proves joyful. It is Deleuze’s point that for such joy to acquire depth, an additional 
thought is needed, namely the thought that such beautiful forms are provided by nature. 
Reason’s meta-aesthetic interest, the thought that nature has produced such beauty, the 
feeling that nature is in the end hospitable to mankind is what makes aesthetic pleasure 
universally expected and complete. If we recall Kant’s insistence that we should 
distinguish between beautiful objects and beautiful views of objects, the latter being the 
case when we see something from afar, indistinctly, and our imagination invents the 
detail, or if we recall how Kant describes our disappointment that what seemed as 
birdsong turns out to be the performance of a skilful whistler, we see how great an 
emphasis Kant places on observing that beautiful form should be genuinely produced by 
nature23. 
While, in the case of the sublime, imagination is freed from the understanding to 
present a negative presentation; in the beautiful, imagination is freed from the 
understanding to dwell in reflection on form. The move that frees the imagination from 
the guidance of the understanding, so that it would not remain in the domain of 
cognizing, is instigated by reason which superimposes on the determining activity of the 
understanding reflective activity, in other words the indeterminate, spontaneous, 
creative activity of the higher faculties. It is in the domain of aesthetic judgment, where 
not only reason’s suprasensible destination is revealed, but also that of the 
imagination24. 
 Ultimately, in Deleuze’s reading of Kant, the interest of reason, the purposiveness of 
the human mind to realize freedom in nature step in to bring about the unification of the 
																																								 																				
22 G. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy - The Doctrine of the Faculties, cit., p. 50. 
23 I. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, cit., 5:243. 
24 G. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy - The Doctrine of the Faculties, cit., p. 51. 
	




faculties. While a determinate accord between the faculties always has a specific 
functional role aimed at carrying out a particular task, the indeterminate accord in 
reflection is like the space between the various gears. In aesthetic reflective judgment, 
the element added to the indeterminate state is a form produced by nature which meets 
the original, spontaneous powers of the imagination, and the awareness that nature gives 
rise to such occasions wherein our mental powers can be realized is what provides the 
pleasure. However, in Deleuze’s analyses, this time spent lingering with beauty is only 
possible because something frees the mind from its routine cognizing activity and puts it 
into the aesthetic reflective mode. It is none other than the interest of reason that enables 
this switch.  
 
Concluding Questions for Further Research  
«What is it that forces us to think?»25 Deleuze famously asks this question as he begins 
to spell out his own philosophy in Difference and Repetition. He investigates both key-
terms of the question: A, what is it that forces? and B, what is it to think?  As he takes 
up Artaud’s confessions to elucidate the problem, we see that the problem of what 
amounts to “thinking” comes very close to the problem of being sensitive to 
circumstance when one should be engaged in determinate vs. reflective judgment.  
Artaud said that the problem (for him) was not to orientate his thought, or to perfect the 
expression of what he thought, or to acquire application and method or to perfect his 
poems, but simply to manage to think something. (…) He knows that the problem is not to 
direct or methodically apply a thought which pre-exists in principle and in nature, but to 
bring into being that which does not yet exist (there is no other work, all the rest is 
arbitrary, mere decoration). To think is to create - there is no other creation - but to create 
is, first of all, to engender «thinking» in thought26. 
The idea to engender thinking into thought, the idea to make thinking an act of creation 
is to arrive at Kant’s moment of reflection, the moment when we have a particular but 
no determinate concept for it. What Deleuze calls «thinking» only starts when we 
realize that our concepts and our habitual ways of cognizing are insufficient. Yet, as we 
																																								 																				
25 G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (1968), translated by P. Patton, Continuum, London-New York 
1994, p.139. 
26 Ivi, p.147. 
	
	




learn from Kant, the encounter with raw, indeterminate material, in itself, is not enough 
to go beyond a simple sense of being overwhelmed, – an exigent demand on the part of 
the thinker is necessary as well. Kant supplies this demand by giving us the image of a 
rational being who is free by virtue of being able to think according to rules, and  whose 
highest vocation, therefore, is to think and act in accordance with their legislating 
reason. Once Deleuze replaces Kant’s theory of human beings gifted with a priori 
modes of thought, which places them in two concurring realms – that of mechanistic 
and potentially chaotic nature, and that of purposeful reason – with his own theory of 
the univocity of being, the question must be asked: what draws one to think in 
Deleuze’s own philosophy? What replaces the interest of reason when contemplating 
the indeterminate given in Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism? 
Could the Spinozian joyful affirmation of life stand in as meta-aesthetic interest in 
enabling the birth of creative thought?  These would be areas to investigate in a further 
essay, exploring the sublime as the experience of the violence of one human capacity 
over the other, forcing one to think and create in realms which surpass the aesthetic.    
 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
